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Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach
do not fit the conditions of travel today.
Whether other jurisdictions will follow the lead of New York is
problematical, but almost any action after such long inaction
would be welcome.
N. A. C.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW
The final judgment in one of the few inharmonious decisions
to come from the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia this
year and one which reflects the consequences and inherent dan-
gers of an appellate court sitting as reviewers of jury conclusions
of fact, makes Simmons v. Craig1 an important case to the prac-
tic'ng attorney in the negligence field.
Craig initiated an action in the Circuit Court of Roanoke
County against Simmons for damages suffered in an automobile
collision occasioned by the alleged negligence of Simmons who
was driving at night without lights on his vehicle. Judgment
was entered in the lower court in favor of Craig on the findings
of the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
the decision in favor of Simmons, two judges dissenting.
Two errors were of concern to the court in justification of
the appeal; the two questions raised being:
1. Was Simmons guilty of any actionable negligence?
2. Was Craig guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law?
One mile east of Vinton, Virginia, a collision occurred at a
late twilight hour and during a heavy rainstorm. Simmons was
driving westwardly toward town and Craig was following an
unidentified motor vehicle going east on Route 24. Simmons' tes-
timony placed his speed at 20 miles per hour while Craig claimed
to have been travelling at a speed of 25 miles per hour just prior
1 199 Va. 338 (1957).
to increasing his speed in attempting to pass the car in front of
him. Craig was familiar with the road and had followed the
other car for a considerable distance until he had reached a
straight stretch of highway before attempting to pass the vehicle.
Chisom, a witness at the trial, who was traveling behind Craig
had initiated a movement into the left lane immediately behind
Craig's truck.
Simmons claims to have had the lights on his vehicle turned
on for a much greater distance than was proved by the evidence
since the weight of evidence reflects that the lights were not
turned on until he was approximately two or three car lengths
ahead of Craig. All evidence was to the effect that it was suf-
ficiently dark to require each of the vehicles to have headlights
on. On this matter the court did not seek to disturb the findings
of the jury.
The majority of the court based their decision on the "Rules
of the Road" provided by the Motor Vehicle Code of Virginia.2
Section 46-2253 was used as a secondary argument for the de-
cision, this section stating that the driver of a vehicle overtaking
another vehicle must sound his horn. In this case the court held
that Craig's failure to sound the horn was a proximate cause of
the accident and that he was contributorily negligent. This
statute was enacted for the benefit of the driver being overtaken
so that he will not attempt to turn into the path of the passing
car. However, the court held that Simmons would have been
warned by the sounding of Craig's horn, had he done so before
attempting to pass. Therefore, Craig was found to be negligent
as a matter of law. In actuality there is nothing in the statute to
give rise to the intent ascribed by the court that it was to warn
a driver coming from the opposite direction.
Irvin Chisom's testimony was given varying degrees of
weight within this opinion; it ranges from that of an expert to
being totally discounted. He had been following Craig, who
was traveling a familiar road, for approximately one mile and
stated that there was a flash of light immediately before the crash.
Chisom stated that he had also initiated a move into the left hand
lane by following Craig. His testimony also claimed that the
2Va. Code, §46-220, 46-242 (1950).
3 Va. Code, §46-225 (1950).
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unlighted car of Simmons should have been visible at a dis-
tance of one hundred fifty feet; the former evidence was totally
disregarded while the latter was accepted to be the opinion of
an expert. The majority of the court failed to take into account
that in spite of the apparent visibility Chisom had nevertheless
intended to pass the same car that Craig had started to pass. It
does not seem logical that Chisom's actions could be that of a
reasonable and prudent man if he attempted to pass a car while
there was a supposedly visible object in the left hand lane. It is
a well known fact that the testimony of a lay witness is of little
value and should not be given the weight relative to that of an
expert.4 Chisom's testimony was viewed in such a manner as to
assume that he was acting as a reasonable man in attempting to
pass the unidentified car in front of Craig and thus presumably
used as a basis for accepting his remaining testimony as that of
an expert. The court made Craig's driving into the left hand
lane in front of an unlighted object negligence as a matter of
law when it should have been a question for the jury. Although
the jury has passed on the question and given a verdict in Craig's
favor, the Court of Appeals has decided to reverse a decision in a
situation where reasonable people could differ.5 In the light of
all the testimony, the court states that the decision of the lower
court was clearly wrong; arguments given to sustain this finding
are based upon the fact that Craig did not sound his horn upon
attempting to pass and the testimony of Chisom who was seeking
to pass the same car as Craig.
In the majority opinion the judges are critical of Craig's
inability to see Simmons' car whereas there is no mention that
Simmons could very well have seen Craig's car and have an-
ticipated the consequences. It is readily apparent that Simmons
was at least equally as negligent as Craig since he did not turn
on his lights until he was two or three car lengths in front of
Craig. This would indicate that he did not see Craig pulling into
the left hand lane even though the lights were burning on Craig's
car. Simmons could possibly have avoided the crash by being
more attentive to his driving and the hazardsO since it is obvious
that he could see Craig's lighted car more easily than Craig could
4 Davis v. Reynolds, 280 F. 363 (1922).
5 Kennedy v. McElroy, 195 Va. 1078, 81 S.E.2d 436 (1954).
6 McNamara v. Rainey Luggage Corp., 139 Va. 197, 123 S.E. 515 (1924).
445
see his unlighted car. The combination of the two circumstances
would appear to make Simmons negligent on the doctrine of last
clear chance and also the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
A reasonably prudent man would have attempted to avoid the
collision when it became apparent that the passing car did not
see the unlighted car in the lane.
As stated in the dissenting opinion, the majority opinion
seeks to place the entire responsibility for the accident on the
driver seeking to pass in reliance upon §46-228. 7 The majority
would make him the insurer of safety even when the driver
coming from the opposite direction is obviously negligent by not
having his lights burning. The majority admitted the fact that
Simmons should have had his lights burning as required by
§46-2758 and that this was the proximate cause of the crash and
then state that, nevertheless, the violation of either §46-2251 or
§46-228"o alone would be sufficient to authorize a verdict in favor
of Simmons. Why should this reasoning be applicable to those
two statutes and not to §46-27511 which was not even questioned
by the two courts since this was found by the jury to be one
of the main reasons for the crash?
It is well settled within this State that the judgment of the
trial court cannot be set aside unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.12 The jury in the trial court returned a
verdict in favor of Craig for the damages incurred and the Su-
preme Court of Appeals has undertaken to reverse this decision.
Evidence and facts presented before the trial court would make it
difficult if not impossible for reasonable men not to differ in their
opinion of this case.
Although the doctrine of comparative negligence has been
considered taboo in Virginia 8 and is not mentioned in the opin-
ion, this case would appear to be an ideal situation for its applica-
tion. In cases of comparative negligence, the courts attempt to
balance the negligence of the parties. It would appear that the
7 Va. Code, §46-228 (1950).
8 Va. Code, §46-275 (1950).
9 Va. Code, §46-225 (1950).
10 Va. Code, §46-228 (1950).
11 Va. Code, §46-275 (1950).
12 Va. Code, §8-491 (1950).
s Light, Torts, 42 Va.L.Rev. 1197, 1209 (Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
1956).
majority of the court was trying in the instant case to avoid its
use, being unwilling to take the first step toward the adoption of
this doctrine. Although the Supreme Court of Appeals in this
case would be giving a much more equitable solution by adopting
this theory and not holding Craig liable for the results of Sim-
mons' negligent act of not turning on the lights of his vehicle
at a time when they were clearly needed, it could have accom-
plished the same result by merely refusing to interfere with the
jury's findings at the trial. It is thus apparent that the Supreme
Court is advising lower courts not to allow juries to compare
negligence in reaching their verdicts for fear of reversal on ap-
peal. As a result, Virginia appears to be, at the present time, on
the basis of the decision of the instant case, unalterably opposed to
any introduction of the doctrine of comparable negligence either
directly through court acquiescence in its principles or indirectly
by satisfaction of jury action which might be based upon it.
A. O. D.
TRUSTS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF
ADOPTION LAWS
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky was faced with what
they termed to be a $64,000.00 question. Is it lawful for a man
to adopt his wife as his child and heir at law?1
Testatrix executed a will, which set up a trust for the life
of her son. At the son's death, the trust was "to be distributed
to the heirs at law of my said son according to the law of Descent
and Distribution" in force in Kentucky at son's death. In 1941,
18 years after testatrix's death, son adopted his wife "as his legal
heir at law and child." The Kentucky Court of Appeals held it
to be lawful to adopt a wife as a child and heir at law in entering
judgment in favor of the wife.
The largest obstacle placed in the court's, path was that the
adoption was void as against public policy. Contestants argued
that this adoption would vitiate common law unity of husband
and wife. The majority of the court held that even though
IBendinger et al. v. Graybill's Executor & Trustees et al., - Ky. -, 302
S.W.2d 594 (1957).
